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Working around the barriers to creating and sharing 
knowledge in capital goods projects: the client’s 
perspective 
 
 
 
The paper considers knowledge management issues from the client’s perspective. In the 
example presented, a sludge treatment centre procured by Northumbrian Water Ltd 
(NWL), the task faced by the client was to manage knowledge in a context where the core 
technology being procured was new and resulted in the need for new knowledge to be 
created and shared both pre- and post- delivery. In exploring these issues, the paper 
reveals the problems of (and some solutions to) managing knowledge across the project 
life-cycle and between different groups, where the motivation for generating and sharing 
knowledge was not the same for all participants. 
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Introduction 
 
The paper considers the knowledge management problems facing clients who are 
procuring complex capital goods1. In the example presented, a sludge treatment centre 
procured by Northumbrian Water Ltd (NWL), the task faced by the client was to manage 
knowledge in a context where the core technology being procured was unfamiliar. In 
contrast to much of the literature on knowledge management in the capital goods project 
context, this paper takes the perspective of the client and considers the means by which 
the client has generated, managed and embedded the knowledge it required from its 
supply chain. The paper shows, however, that in complex multi-organisational and 
fragmented contexts like capital goods projects, where sharing knowledge across 
organisational and inter-organisational boundaries is essential, the motivation of different 
groups to do so can be unevenly distributed across the structure and temporal span of the 
project. The paper also reports on some of the ways in which the client, motivated by the 
need to generate and embed new knowledge from its suppliers and its own internal 
operations, acted to re-configure some of the interactions and motivations within the 
project to encourage the generation and availability of new knowledge where it was 
needed.    
 
 
Knowledge management and organisational learning 
 
Knowledge management is increasingly viewed as key to competitive success for the 
organisation (Easterby-Smith et al., 2000). Knowledge and its proper management are 
now regarded, moreover, as essential for firm survival in increasingly turbulent and 
competitive environments (Davenport and Prusack, 1998; Easterby-Smith, et al. 2000; De 
Long and Seemann, 2000; Brown and Duguid, 1991) and knowledge is viewed as critical 
to ensuring that new products and services can be created and improved (Hamel and 
Prahalad, 1994; Teece and Pisano, 1994; Robertson, et al., 2003). As Howells (1996) 
notes, “...it has become increasingly acknowledged that the contribution of technological 
innovation to growth and economic performance is not just simply associated with 
embodied technologies, such as new plant and equipment, but is also highly dependent on 
disembodied, intangible assets and working practices" (p. 91).  
 
Theories of knowledge have, therefore, set down deep roots in management theory and 
practice. Organisations have come to be conceived of as 'systems of knowledge' (Blackler 
and Crump, 2000) and as 'knowledge-based systems' (Tsoukas, 1996). Organisations have 
also come to be seen as sites of 'situated learning' (Fox, 2000) and as comprised of 
                                                           
1
 A capital good is a physical artefact which forms part of the operations of the client organisation in which 
it is embedded. Capital goods may include, therefore, such artefacts as buildings, IT systems, manufacturing 
process machinery, weapons systems, trains, ships and aircraft.  
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'communities of practice' with their own knowledge and embedded practices (Lave and 
Wenger, 1991). Interest in organisational learning, knowledge creation and knowledge 
management within projects is a more recent phenomenon and one that has received less 
attention (van Donk and Riezebos, 2004; Fernie, et al., 2003). Nevertheless, here also, 
organisational learning and knowledge management is coming to be seen as a crucial 
component of both successful project-based firms and projects. Knowledge management 
is seen as critical for contracting firms to capture learning that will improve their 'front-
end' processes of bid preparation and planning (Davies and Brady, 2000) and in ensuring 
the sharing of knowledge within and across projects and project-based organisations 
(Gann and Salter, 2000; Prencipe and Tell, 2001; Ruuska and Vartiainen, 2005). Good 
knowledge management is also seen to lie at the heart of innovation in the capital goods 
industries through, for example, encouraging the development of tacit knowledge for 
problem solving (Barlow, 2000) and contributing to the ability of projects to meet their 
clients’ needs (Alderman et al., 2003). Critically, the temporary 'project team' is 
increasingly seen as the focal point for learning (Barlow, 2000). 
 
As the subject has been populated by social and organisational theorists, approaches to 
knowledge and knowledge management have become increasingly distanced from their 
‘rationalist’ roots. The ‘rationalist’ approach to knowledge management regards 
knowledge as a commodity (Whitley, 2000) and as an asset (Marshall and Sapsed, 2000), 
capable of being acquired and deployed like other material resources2. As such, this 
approach, where it does see problems to be solved, sees them in terms of systems to 
ensure the codification and circulation of knowledge (Bresnen et al., 2003). The rational 
view of knowledge, however, has been increasingly criticised from the perspective of a 
model which views all knowledge as, at least in part, tacit (e.g. Hislop, 2002); a 
perspective that treats knowledge as people-centred and is dominant in social science 
discourses (Alvesson and Karreman, 2001). In this model, knowledge cannot be viewed 
as a 'commodity' or tangible ‘thing’, but must be seen as an interactive process tied 
inexorably to the context of its production (Bresnen, et al., 2003). Moreover, this tacit 
aspect of knowledge, ‘knowing’, can only properly be developed through the 'conscious 
effort' (Howells, 1996). Moreover, ‘learning by doing', 'learning by using', 'learning to 
learn' and ‘trial and error’, all of which are crucial elements of developing this 
knowledge, require direct on-the-job experience of machines, work practice and 
operations (Howells, 1996). It follows, therefore, that a proportion of the knowledge that 
is critical to effective operations is not merely an object that is 'captured', ‘stored’ and 
‘transferred’, but rather it is part of a process involving action (Blackler, 1993) and 
practice (Brown and Duguid, 1999). Thus, we see the management of knowledge as 
necessarily 'close-in' and as cognisant of the practical issues facing individuals in the 
context of their work (e.g. unexpected technical problems, cross-boundary politics and so 
on). Our focus in this paper is, therefore, less on knowledge management 'systems' (in the 
                                                           
2
 This view has been seized upon and reinforced by Information Technology system builders (Easterby-
Smith, et al.2000). The 'IT’ view of knowledge, in keeping with its rationalist roots,  rests upon, and 
reinforces, the increasingly outmoded view that organizations are unitary, mechanistic systems (Tsoukas 
and Cummings, 1997). 
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formal or technical sense), as on management practice in the context of complex capital 
goods procurement.  
 
 
Creating and sharing knowledge within and across organisations 
 
For the purposes of this paper, work on knowledge management has been subdivided into 
three broad and overlapping categories: communities (those approaches which stress the 
role of social groupings in knowledge production); organisational context (those 
approaches which stress the embedded nature of knowledge and its dependence on the 
context of its production); and networks (those approaches which stress the importance of 
the flow of knowledge). These categories are by no means exclusive and many authors 
draw upon more than one. However they form a useful way of organising thinking about 
key issues in knowledge management, particularly in the context of capital goods 
projects3. These categories are discussed in more detail below. 
 
Communities 
The community approach to knowledge is rooted in the sociology of knowledge (e.g. 
Kuhn, 1970, Berger and Luckman, 1979) and ‘communities of practice’ (Lave and 
Wenger, 1991; Brown and Duguid, 1991). Together these approaches stress the 
importance of the shared practice, mental models, language, systems of meaning and 
schemas held by individuals in a given community. These practices, mental models, 
schemas, languages and systems of meaning are taken to develop, through interaction, in 
conjunction with other members of that community. Thus, for example, 'understanding', 
and therein the co-production of knowledge, is seen to occur through 'narration' and 
'shared work' (Bresnen, et al., 2003) in the context of institutionally-shaped ‘ways of 
doing’ (Robertson et al., 2003). A closely related approach, the 'activity systems' 
approach (Blackler, 1993; Blackler et al., 1998) makes a similar claim. The creation and 
exchange of knowledge is also seen by this approach as an activity bounded by a 
particular social group. 'Activity systems', argue Blackler et al. (1998), comprise the 
social, linguistic and material practices which make 'knowing' possible. Within activity 
systems, interaction (and so the production and exchange of knowledge) is mediated by 
tradition, rules, divisions of labour and so forth. The goals and objectives which guide 
knowledge production are themselves also constrained by the culture, roles and 
technologies defined by the activity system (Blackler, 1993). These systems assimilate 
newcomers through socialisation and themselves also evolve over time (i.e. they learn 
from past experience). They are, in other words, self-reproducing and rooted in their own 
history. Lave and Wenger (1991) make a similar point about the development of 
                                                           
3
 Capital goods projects involve a number of different communities (e.g. consultants, contractors, materials 
and technology suppliers). Each project will also comprise a particular organisational context in terms of a 
particular structure and culture. A project can be, for instance, more or less adversarial depending on the 
contract conditions determined by the client. Capital goods projects are also comprised of networks in the 
form of extended supply chains and other inter-organisational and personal networks. 
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communities through apprenticeship. This, however, can make such systems resistant to 
change and, moreover, unintelligible to ‘outsiders’. 
 
Communities and 'activity systems' have critical implications for knowledge transfer 
which are largely ignored or down-played by traditional approaches to knowledge 
management.  Because knowledge is tied up in the specific language practices of 
particular communities, its externalisation does not necessarily then make it available to 
other, different, communities (Bresnen et al., 2003).  
 
Organisational Context 
Organisational culture, routines and management practices are also viewed as essential to 
the facilitation of knowledge-sharing in the people centred-approach. These affect 
communication flows, organisational roles and, by implication, information sharing 
(McGill and Slocum, 1994). There has been an increasing interest, for example, in the 
conditions in which tacit experience-based knowledge is best externalised by individuals 
and made available for others to use (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995, Nonaka and Konno, 
1998). Although Information Technology is seen as a knowledge exchange enabler 
(Nonaka and Konno, 1998), social context is nevertheless recognised by these authors as 
a critical and ‘enabling condition' for sharing knowledge. For example, environments 
which are emotionally supportive (Nonaka and Konno, 1998), or which support 
experimentation and reward innovation (Dougherty and Hardy, 1996), are seen as critical 
to knowledge creation. Similarly, trust is seen as critical to knowledge sharing; the 
presence of trust results in a reduction of opportunistic behaviour with regards to 
knowledge and this makes knowledge exchange possible (Heumer et al., 1998, Howells, 
1996). Therefore, organisational cultures that support the development of interpersonal 
trust also appear to support knowledge sharing. 
 
Loose organisational structures are also seen as supportive of knowledge creation and 
exchange (Ravasi and Verona, 2001). Roles and authority should be relatively ambiguous 
(in their words 'loosely coupled') to allow dialogue and the "creative combination and re-
combination of individual and organisational knowledge" (p.43). Conversely, they 
suggest, tight coupling can reduce creativity (i.e. knowledge may be shared but it may be 
highly conservative). A preoccupation with measurement (and punishment) may also,  
they suggest, create a functional environment that will hamper creativity and 
collaboration, while overly formal structures can trap and hide knowledge within 
organisations.  
 
Networks 
Knowledge-exchanging networks form both within and between organisations and 
constitute the backbone of the communications system by which knowledge is shared and 
co-developed. Collaborative networks between firms are often central to the development 
of new technologies (James and Howells, 2000; Semilies, 1999) and in particular 
complex technologies (Molina, 1989, 1993; Miller et al.,1995). Networks with other 
organisations often constitute the source of new market and technical knowledge, for 
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example from users (e.g. von Hippel, 1988) or suppliers (e.g. Gann, 2000).  Knowledge 
exchange through collaboration means that an organisation can overcome, to a large 
extent, the slow processes of internal learning (Grant, 1997) and that they can gain access 
to technological knowledge and competencies beyond their own knowledge boundaries 
(Tidd et al., 1997). Firms are also able to make greater use of the knowledge they already 
hold by collaborating (Grant, 1997; Shapiro, 1999).  
 
As within organisations, knowledge is also best built and shared between organisations 
through close-knit trust-based networks (Bresnen et al., 2003; Larsson, et al., 1998).  
Networks may constitute trust-based communities, such as the architectural profession 
(Symes et al., 1995), or suppliers of similar specialist products in a small industry where 
knowledge-sharing is the norm even between potential competitors (e.g. suppliers of 
specialist components to complex products such as flight simulators, Miller et al., 1995) 
or where supplier knowledge is essential to support client adoption (Grant and Gregory, 
1997; Grant et al., 1991 Chai, et al. 2003; Bohn, 1994). 
 
Knowledge transfer can occur through a number of means: the transfer of equipment, 
documentation, know-how that has been documented in 'black books'4, formal training by 
knowledgeable staff (e.g. from the supplier), on-the-job training and site visits to the 
supplying organisation (Grant and Gregory, 1997). Chai et al.'s summary of the 
knowledge transfer literature also identifies inter-organisational teams, boundary 
spanners, best practice guides and procedures, internal conferences and staff transfer. As 
they point out, however, different types of knowledge and knowledge requirements 
require different sorts of transfer mechanism. With respect to technology transfer they 
divide knowledge into knowledge for the purposes of creating awareness and for the 
development of skills once the technology has been adopted. Awareness, Chai et al. 
argue, can be served by boundary spanners, internal conferences and meetings, audits and 
periodicals whereas the knowledge required to develop skills and processes that will 
support the technology once adopted requires a more intense interaction, such as that 
provided by detailed reports, periodicals, best practice guides, benchmarking visits, staff 
transfer and training of staff by the technology supplier. 
 
It follows, however, that successful (technology-related) knowledge transfer will depend 
greatly on the adopting firm’s own internal capabilities to absorb knowledge (Cohen and 
Levinthal, 1990; Grant et al., 1991). Important, therefore, are the skills, experience and 
education levels of the workforce and the degree to which senior management are 
prepared to bring about the organisational changes that are often necessary to properly 
embed a major capital good within an organisation (Grant et al., 1991).  
 
Networks through which knowledge can transfer may also be formal or informal 
(Conway, 2000). Informal networks, claims Conway, are key in knowledge diffusion. 
                                                           
4
 These are an attempt to document the ‘know how’ present in the heads of existing operators (Grant and 
Gregory, 1997). 
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They fill in the gaps left by formal organisational structures (see also Dougherty and 
Hardy, 1996) and perform important boundary-spanning activities between otherwise 
unconnected sources of knowledge within the organisation. However, such networks can 
also be corrosive in that they can form goals that contradict those of the formal 
organisation. They may also be the cause of the loss of competitive knowledge to other 
organisations such as customers or partners who may then go on to become competitors 
(Boisot, 1995). 
 
Summary    
It is clear from the literature that the creation and distribution of new knowledge is 
dependent upon a complex mix of factors. Knowledge needs the right environment for its 
creation. Staff must exist in an organisational culture which supports and values creativity 
and knowledge sharing. Having achieved the creation of knowledge, its distribution still 
faces, it is suggested, considerable barriers. Codified knowledge travels all too easily into 
the hands of competitors (Bosoit, 1995) but not so tacit knowledge. Close contact in a 
common working environment and suitable network conduits are necessary, but not 
necessarily sufficient, for tacit knowledge transfer between groups. A strong case is made 
in the literature reviewed for the notion of knowledge as tied to particular contexts of 
production and for knowledge which is coded in the languages, beliefs and practices of 
particular groups, making it inaccessible to others.   
 
The following section extends the logic of these observations to the contexts and 
structures which typically comprise the capital goods project.  
 
 
Knowledge management in the capital goods sector 
 
Knowledge management is seen as particularly difficult to execute effectively in the 
project context which underpins capital goods production (Shapiro, 1999; Gann and 
Salter, 1998; Gann, 2000; Coombs and Hull, 1997; Davies and Brady, 2000; Brady and 
Davies 2003; Bresnen et. al., 2003; Fernie et al., 2003; Ruuska and Vartiainen, 2005).  In 
particular, knowledge management activity is viewed as hamstrung by the prevailing 
business and operational conditions which characterise such projects: their ‘one-off’ and 
temporary nature, the structural fragmentation inherent in their organisation, the presence 
of culturally disparate professions, the project rather than business process focus of many 
of the firms associated with projects and the typically low-levels of inter-organisational 
trust stemming from divergent interests.  This section considers these issues in detail.  
The literature drawn upon ranges across research into construction projects, complex 
products development and IT systems; however, the focus here is upon generic issues for 
knowledge generation and sharing in projects. 
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Low levels of trust 
As noted, one of the key requirements for co-operative knowledge creation and sharing 
between parties is trust.  Problematically, for a number of reasons, trust is difficult to 
build in the context of projects.  A key problem within projects is that knowledge 
exchanging networks rarely have an opportunity to develop because of their task-focussed 
nature (Koskinen et. al., 2003).  Time pressures also mean project actors simply do not 
have time to become familiar with one another’s perspectives and as a consequence they 
depend more upon assumptions about one another’s roles than actual experience.  As Gail 
(1994) has noted with respect to construction projects, assumptions about other actors’ 
likely intentions and actions tend to be negative.  
 
Fragmented networks 
Large-scale projects (such as the one discussed in this paper) tend to be multi-technology 
and multi-organisational.  Such projects rely on a wide range of inputs and expertise 
drawn from a host of other organisations including the customer, suppliers and numerous 
other organisations in both the public and private sectors (McLoughlin et. al., 2000).  
Such arrangements tend to result in extreme complexity in terms of relationships, 
communications and the assembly and use of knowledge.  The fragmented nature of work 
and the need to meet diverse client goals hamper the ability of firms to assimilate, and 
indeed even to recognise the value of, knowledge generated in other parts of a project 
(Koskinen et. al., 2003). Indeed, clients themselves often comprise differing groups with 
differing perceptions and objectives. Suchman (1994), for instance, argues that ‘the 
client’ (e.g. for a complex product like a computer system) is, upon closer inspection, 
itself comprised of “….multiple constituencies, each with its own professional identities 
and views of the others” (p.32).  Cherns and Bryant (1984) reinforce the point by 
describing the construction client as “… a complex of interest groups, some congruent, 
some competing.” (p.181). As such, the knowledge demands and outputs of these groups 
are likely to be very different, with the consequence that capital goods clients are 
themselves also likely to comprise numerous sites of knowledge production and 
consumption.  Attempts to exchange knowledge can therefore also be expected to 
encounter difficulties resulting from strong institutional, professional and contractual 
demarcations as noted in construction (IPRA, 1992), complex products (Shapiro, 1999) 
and projects generally Koskinen et. al., (2003).   
 
Contractual culture 
As a body of knowledge, project management generally advocates tight hierarchical 
divisions and control within the project (Thomas and Buckle, 2004).  This has three key 
effects on knowledge exchange.  Firstly, the hierarchical organisation of projects means 
that the contractor’s knowledge and experience is often separated from the client by a 
management tier of consultants. Therefore, unless contractors are leading the project 
themselves they rarely have the opportunity to suggest improvements (based on their 
expertise) directly to the client.  Secondly, the formal project processes which 
characterise project management (rigid deadlines, work break-down structure, critical 
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paths and stage gates) also break up the learning process by preventing knowledge from 
persisting for the necessary gestation period (Miller, 1995).  Thirdly, contractually-
defined supply relationships, typical of construction and other contract based industries, 
are often litigious in nature, encouraging a climate of inter-organisational mistrust which 
further undermines the possibilities for knowledge sharing between organisations 
(Miozzo and Ivory, 1998).     
 
Lack of repeatability 
Learning within and across projects can also be difficult simply because projects, by their 
very nature, are usually novel in at least some respects. It has been noted that contractors 
focussing on similar projects can begin to build some competencies in areas such as 
bidding (see, for example, Brady and Davies (2003) with respect to complex products), 
but it remains that the majority of projects make this difficult by presenting technological 
and social variation (see, for example Slaughter (2000) with respect to construction). 
Projects are also in a state of continuous flux in terms of the material, the personnel and 
the information they create.  That is, they do not develop the ‘steady-state’ routines 
(Levitt and March, 1988) that allow knowledge to be captured and reinforced (Bresnen, 
et. al., 2003).  Over the life of the project, knowledge may be lost purely as a result of 
team members moving to other projects (Gann and Salter, 2000).  Relatedly, Coombs and 
Hull (1998) note that project-based organisations tend typically to be focussed almost 
wholly on project completion and that project teams are disbanded and re-deployed on 
new projects as soon as possible, often before lessons learned can be shared (Keegan and 
Turner, 2001).   
 
Summary 
The conclusion that projects are not places to expect knowledge management excellence 
appears fairly inescapable.  The nature of projects in terms of their lack of repeatability 
and routinisation, their often hard-nosed contractual culture when dealing with supply 
chains and contractors, hierarchical management and the fragmented communities of 
actors which comprise them, all point to a gloomy prognosis for knowledge creation and 
exchange. 
 
 
Research approach and methodology 
 
Our approach to exploring these issues constitutes a detailed analysis of what it is that the 
organisation’s networks, and the institutions, actors and technologies and other material 
resources that constitute them, actually do (Coombs and Hull, 1998). Shapiro’s (1999) 
review of the literature on learning/knowledge management issues notes the paucity of 
research in the area of the capital goods projects. Our aim is to start to redress this 
problem by examining the specific case of a complex project involving a mix of 
construction and new technology procurement. Accordingly, given the state of current 
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understanding in this area, our methodology was designed to provide a ‘rich’ description 
of the knowledge management issues in this currently under-researched and far from fully 
understood area where, nevertheless, significant practical and more conceptual insights 
might be gained. 
 
The principal method of research was through interviews with key staff in relevant 
departments, business units and supply organisations. A thematic interview outline was 
prepared for each interview, although in every case interviewees were invited to broaden 
the depth and scope of the discussion. Each outline comprised a set of brainstormed 
‘themes’ to be discussed and some specific questions aimed at establishing points of fact 
or the validity of information gained from previous interviews. Themes and questions 
were developed as the research progressed. Each interview involved at least two members 
of the research team and lasted between 1 and 3 hours. The research team itself was a 
multi-disciplinary one comprising of three social scientists, an economist and an engineer 
allowing varying perspectives to be brought to bear on the interpretation of interview 
material.   
 
Interviews for the case study were undertaking with 13 individuals. These were with 
contractors (3), suppliers (1), consultants (2), NWL Project Managers (2), NWL senior 
staff (3), Operations Managers (2). The interviews were recorded and edited 
transcriptions, based on two independent sets of interview notes, were made available for 
correction and comment by the interviewees.  
 
The case study itself was one of three case studies that were the focus of a larger research 
project concerned with knowledge and supply chain management in complex projects. 
The NWL case study was particularly interesting because it comprised the procurement of 
a technology which stood outside the experience of the client. While our original interests 
were in knowledge management for procurement, we also noted the importance of 
knowledge management much further on in the project life cycle, including post-delivery 
and the embedding of the technology into the client's operations. This observation, and 
the exploration of its implications, became the basis of this paper. 
 
The case study is reported below as a largely linear account of the unfolding of the project 
from its initial feasibility and procurement through construction and finally to its 
embedding in the operations of the client. The unfolding of the case study is considered 
largely in terms of the key knowledge management activities that occurred as the project 
progressed. Through our analysis of the interview material we came to see the key 
problem for this client as one of creating knowledge in one context that could be 
transferred to, and embedded in, another context (e.g. between stages of the project or 
between those directly associated with the project and those elsewhere in the 
commissioning organisation’s business). We thus came to see the embedding of 
knowledge as a matter of different groups at different stages in the project process 
creating knowledge iteratively in conjunction with the supply chain, and other key supply 
side actors such as consultants, and thereafter of inter-stage and inter-group knowledge 
transfer where deemed appropriate.  
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One useful way of examining the role of these different contexts was to reflect upon 
knowledge generation and sharing practices as they were distributed across the different 
stages of the project. With this in mind we have labelled what we see as the key stages of 
learning and knowledge management as: 1) pre-project learning (scoping, developing 
options and feasibility studies); 2) detailed design and construction (the application and 
potential development of existing project management skills); 3) operational and post-
commission learning (absorbing and developing knowledge relevant to operations); and 
4) organisational learning (embedding what has been learned from the project in the 
parent organisation). We have used these stages as the organising principle of the paper. 
The nature of each of these four stages is explored below in the context of the case study. 
 
 
Case study background 
 
The Regional Sludge Treatment Centre (RSTC) is a £122m state-of-the-art sludge drying 
facility built between 1993 and 2002 by Northumbrian Water Limited (NWL) to serve the 
UK’s Northeast region. The building of the plant was prompted primarily by a 1991 EU 
directive banning sea disposal (initially by 2003 but subsequently brought forward to 
2000). This required, in effect, that NWL find ways to render the end product inert so that 
alternative means of disposal could be used. With the RSTC in place at Bran Sands, 
sewage sludge is now collected from a number of sites across the region (the first point of 
processing) to be transferred (mainly by ship and, to a lesser degree, by road and pipeline) 
for final treatment at Bran Sands.  Sludge produced at the Bran Sands Effluent Treatment 
Works, which handles industrial effluent from Teesside industry, is also transferred to the 
sludge treatment facility.  
 
The core requirements for the sludge treatment technology were that it should be safe, 
flexible, secure, economic and manageable over a 20 year time-horizon. Drying, rather 
than incineration, was decided upon at an early stage because of the negative public 
perceptions associated with incineration. The drying process converts the sludge into inert 
granules or pellets with a variety of possible downstream uses, for example, in 
agriculture, horticulture, land reclamation, or as a fuel. The technology adopted employs 
the direct drying approach whereby the sludge is in direct contact with hot-air. The sludge 
is rotated inside a drum with hot air passing through it.  The RSTC project, deemed a 
great success externally and within NWL, has attracted world-wide attention and has 
placed NWL at the leading edge of sludge treatment amongst water utilities.  
 
The RSTC itself, the focus of our research, was essentially a construction project built 
around a core process technology – the sludge drying plant. In keeping with its past 
experience of large capital goods projects, NWL made extensive use of consultants and 
suppliers in the design and construction of the RSTC, but operated the plant itself. NWL 
was therefore both the customer for, and user of, the plant. At the time of the project, 
NWL had a long history of capital goods investment but of a relatively straightforward 
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'civil engineering' nature (i.e. reservoirs, pipelines, settlement tanks and storage tanks). A 
sludge drying plant, by contrast, constitutes a chemical processing plant and, therefore, a 
significantly more complex proposition. The RSTC was built in two phases, with the 
second phase mirroring the first in overall design, in order to allow a period of learning 
between the two phases.   
 
 
Pre-project learning: procurement and conceptual design 
 
Large expensive projects like Bran Sands constitute a high risk for clients such as NWL, 
not least because if they do not procure the right solution their operations will be 
adversely affected in the long-term. As such there are strong motivations to generate the 
knowledge that will ensure that mistakes are not made. NWL’s task was particularly 
difficult here as the technology identified to accomplish its requirements, although not 
new to the world, was unfamiliar to the Investment Delivery Team (project team) and 
alien to their normal operations5. The technology therefore required that NWL staff climb 
a steep learning curve that would allow them not only to make correct procurement 
choices but also to manage the operations of the plant once it was transferred to them. 
 
The knowledge NWL needed in order to make the right procurement choices resided in 
the supply base. Moreover, NWL recognised that it required a certain level of prior 
knowledge, or absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990) for that knowledge to be 
of use. NWL had to be able to determine, for instance, what sorts of solutions were 
implied by ‘direct’ or alternatively ‘indirect’ drying6. It also had to identify a solution 
which could offer high levels of operational safety and the required flexibility of end 
product7. To this end, NWL instigated a managed design competition by paying each of 
four short-listed competing technology suppliers to work up their designs to a high level 
of completion. As part of that competition, while protecting the proprietary knowledge of 
each of the bidders, NWL also encouraged and managed the production and sharing of 
knowledge between the bidders by making available knowledge that had been jointly 
created with NWL. This meant not only that the solution arrived at was optimised, but 
that NWL and its consultant Environmental Technology (ENTEC) were able learn more 
about what was possible, at what cost and with what ultimate result. NWL could be said, 
therefore, to have turned its supplier selection process into a formalised knowledge-
generating process by putting in place appropriate incentives for its suppliers. Indeed, not 
only did the suppliers have the motivation to create knowledge but they operated in a 
                                                           
5
 As a project manager at Bran Sands noted in respect of this: “The days when sewage flowed in one end of 
the plant and out of the other of its own accord have long gone”. The radical nature of the change for 
NWL was also reflected in the following statement made by a Health and Safety Executive visitor to the 
plant which was reported as: “Welcome to the chemical industry”. 
6Indirect drying involves a sheet of metal that heats the sludge as the sludge moves over it. This method can 
involve either a series of plates, modules that extrude the sludge, or a drum.  
7
 I.e. a dried pellet with high calorific value making it suitable as a fertilizer or a fuel. 
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manner which implied a great deal of trust not normally associated with the contracting 
process in construction. NWL ensured that this was possible by re-configuring the normal 
tendering process in this particular way. The final selection was informed by 
consideration of whole-life costs, the hazard potential of the process, energy 
consumption, transport costs, additive costs (e.g. polyelectrolytes) and the type of dust 
produced. 
 
  
Detailed design and construction 
 
Design 
Once the conceptual design was complete the requirements of the project were then 
outlined and costs estimated. However, before any project proceeds at NWL it is tested to 
ensure that it genuinely "holds water" in economic and technical terms. Consultants from 
the project evaluation unit in NWL, therefore, scrutinised the proposed project, their job 
being to "pull the project apart", to identify possible problems and to agree final 
solutions. Involving other people from within NWL helped the core project team avoid 
the formation of “tunnel vision” by bringing in experience from other projects. This is one 
way of ensuring that previous project knowledge is made available to new projects - here 
project-to-project learning occurs through the involvement of an 'experienced eye'.  
  
Another important route for previous project experience to find its way into new projects 
was through what NWL called the Project Sponsor. In this case the transfer of knowledge 
was motivated by the need to ensure that projects delivered by enthusiastic investment 
delivery teams actually served the operational needs of the business. Experience had 
shown that technical staff in lead positions on projects often took a very 'engineering' or 
‘front end’ view of what was required (i.e. that not enough attention was paid to the 
downstream needs of operations). Traditionally in NWL there had been a clear split 
between construction and operations, so that only those aspects of the project which had 
been commissioned became the operational manager's responsibility. NWL's response to 
this problem was to create the Project Sponsor role. The Project Sponsor is tasked to 
oversee a project from feasibility through to completion and in so doing ensures that the 
project meets the business’s overall needs. Project Sponsors also tend to have an 
operations background and so bring an ‘operator’s eye’ to the project. The Bran Sands 
project was one of the first NWL projects in which a Project Sponsor was used. The key 
aim of the Project Sponsor role was to use operations knowledge to guide the design 
solutions proposed by the investment delivery team and their consultants. As such, the 
Project Sponsor can be seen as a boundary-spanner supporting knowledge-flow between 
the two communities.  
  
 
Construction 
In the building phase, the frenetic knowledge-creating activity which characterised the 
early feasibility and design phase of the project was replaced by a focus on taking what 
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had been specified and delivering it (on time and to cost). Introducing new knowledge at 
this stage is more difficult as designs and contracts of work are finalised. Activities aimed 
at the generation of new knowledge (or activities requiring new knowledge such as 
innovation) can be perceived as getting in the way of the main goal of delivering the 
project. Clients and contractors in particular have strong motivations to focus on 
completion. Clients face lost income (and in the case of NWL, regulatory penalties) for 
late completion, while contractors face contractually-agreed penalties for late completion 
and loss of profit if they are over-budget.  
 
To render the construction process as manageable as possible, traditional project 
management encourages sharp demarcations between project activities. For example, in 
phase one of the project, NWL insisted that those contractors working on both the 
Regional Sludge Treatment Centre (RSTC) and the adjacent Effluent Treatment Works 
(ETW) should observe a 'glass wall' between the two developments despite the fact that 
they were intrinsically related and formed part of a larger coherent programme of 
developments. This meant that they were required to have distinct and separately 
managed project teams for the RSTC and the ETW. In effect this sacrificed potential 
resource-sharing and learning in favour of improved project manageability. Although 
relaxed in phase two, when the demands of the building programme were better 
understood, this practice remained in place for some aspects of the project.  
 
The project management structure also reflected NWL's desire to out-source most of the 
day-to-day project management function. The organisational arrangements on the project 
were such that suppliers worked for NWL's consultant ENTEC. Although NWL worked 
hard to ensure open relationships with contractors and suppliers, subsequent ‘distance’ 
from the customer was felt by some contractors and suppliers to be a key barrier to 
knowledge exchange. Contractors also reported finding it difficult to “get engineers 
together” at NWL to give them presentations on new technologies and techniques, 
essentially due to pressures on their time.  
  
Some of the contractors on the project did make efforts to liaise with each other more 
informally. For example, undertaking small but important electrical jobs for one another, 
lending fork lift trucks, getting together to arrange common services (e.g. food). This 
encouraged team building and made more effective use of resources.  
 
What begins to emerge, nevertheless, as one looks across the life-cycle of the project, is a 
shift in the focus of actors initially towards and then away from knowledge management 
activities.  
 
 
Operational and post-commission learning 
 
The conclusion of the delivery phase of the project once again re-focused the attention of 
those involved onto knowledge creation and transfer. NWL shifted its resources from 
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project delivery to project operations as it faced the reality of having to embed its new 
acquisition into its operations. Complex capital goods require a good deal of embedding 
in their host - they rarely work entirely satisfactorily 'out of the box' and their operation is 
invariably improved over time through learning (Bohn, 1994). The RSTC was no 
different. Sewage sludge varies considerably in its characteristics from one location to 
another, which made it difficult to anticipate precisely how the technology would perform 
once fully commissioned. For NWL this meant a concerted effort at learning through 
identifying operational problems and developing solutions to them. 
 
On the RSTC project the Design Operators Group (DOG) was the point of facilitation for 
much of this learning. The DOG involved operators, members of the Investment Delivery 
Team, Andritz (the manufacturer of the sludge drying equipment) and, where appropriate, 
other members of the supply chain. Meetings of the DOG were held monthly and were 
aimed at identifying difficulties with the equipment over the longer-term. NWL found the 
group useful in as much as they could “…talk though some of the operations issues…it is 
a very complex process plant”.  More broadly, the group has also helped to build 
cohesion in the Bran Sands project team. It was felt that the scale of Bran Sands 
otherwise meant there were few opportunities for a comprehensive exchange of views 
(there were four operator shifts, a maintenance crew, managers, water quality operators 
and environmental analysts). On smaller projects a closer interaction between the sponsor 
and the user is possible and the normal core team meeting would suffice. 
 
Andritz was also able to benefit from the DOG in terms of feedback to design by gaining 
access to information on the ‘actual’, as opposed to the ‘expected’, operation of 
equipment. As a consequence of this learning the air handling system was changed 
significantly: the efficiency and accessibility for maintenance of the duct work in and 
around the drying plant was improved substantially; access hatches and surveillance 
cameras for monitoring silos and screw conveyors were subsequently installed. The 
performance of the sludge cake silos was also improved.8 
  
Moreover, it also provided opportunities for them to input into the running of the plant 
where operators were not following expected practice.  So successful had this been for 
Andritz that it planned to instigate similar meetings with new clients.  Interestingly, there 
was also some evidence that these relations were helped by institutional factors. In 
particular, for Andritz's engineers there was a certain level of professionalism associated 
with contributing to design improvement. As Andritz's contract manager commented "we 
are too much engineers to say its your [NWL’s] problem".  
 
A company-wide Strategic Sludge Group (SSG) comprised of management, from 
director-level upward was also set up as a learning mechanism to ensure that the 
                                                           
8
 The phase-one operators had found that clogging occurred unless the silo was operated at less than half 
full. In phase 2, not only was access improved for ‘rodding out’, but the design was also improved to reduce 
clogging; the silo was made wider at the bottom to prevent bridging across the screws, which was causing 
the clogging.  
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organisation as a whole was able to respond effectively to new issues emerging from the 
sludge drying process. Although this was an investigative group and had no powers to 
instigate projects, the group could nevertheless smooth the way for research programmes. 
Because senior managers sat on the SSG it also made it a good forum to make (and 
rehearse) presentations that would bring particular problems to the attention of senior 
management in the business. From the perspective of operations and of the remaining 
Investment Delivery Team, the key objective of meetings with this group was to convince 
the business at large that its problems were serious enough to require attention. 
 
The post-procurement phase also triggered within NWL the generation of new 
operational procedures, new skills and new working practices. This learning, however, 
also showed some of the difficulties of getting groups to exchange knowledge in a 
context where there are few perceived benefits in so doing. In the RSTC project, this 
issue was manifest in the project handover to operations. During this period it was noted 
by one operations respondent that there was no maintenance schedule or operating 
manuals in place when the RSTC was commissioned and that ‘data collection’ procedures 
for equipment had not been set up on time. A key reason for this was the late arrival of 
operations staff at the plant; operations management were placed on site only four months 
prior to handover and some staff only after the plant was running.  The timing of this was 
determined ultimately by the business rather than the operators or investment delivery 
team and reflected, one project manager felt, an underestimation of the uncertainties and 
complexities facing operations in the context of a newly-adopted and unfamiliar 
technology. It also reflected, however, the largely 'project delivery' focus of the 
Investment Delivery Team. It was clear that something of a knowledge ‘watershed’ 
existed between them and the operators. However, it appears that in this case, it was less 
a divide between two ‘communities’ or ‘activity systems’ that rendered them non-
communicative (the DOG shows that they were well able to communicate), as a lack of 
motivation in the project team to spend time on tasks defined by them as non-core (such 
as helping prepare operating manuals or procedures or ensuring that they were provided 
by suppliers). In other words they were not properly motivated or resourced to do so. 
  
Operational learning was another important area of activity for NWL, though again one 
which pointed to the critical importance of the motivation to learn. A key problem for 
NWL was a lack of experience of similar technologies amongst their operators. 
Consequently, they were faced with having to learn virtually from scratch about a 
technology that was quite alien to them. An initial strategy had involved bringing in staff 
from outside the water industry from more chemical-process oriented sectors. However, a 
recruitment ban in force at NWL meant that staff had to be sourced internally. While at 
the project level it was felt that, ideally, experience would have come half from sludge 
drying and half from the process industries, ultimately, of the thirty-two staff required to 
operate the plant, only nine were from the process industries. Staff at NWL had also been 
on a two week visit to a similar facility in the US but found it difficult to assimilate the 
knowledge they needed through observation alone and in the two weeks they had 
available to them. Consequently, Andritz's role, while it involved transferring knowledge 
through manuals and training support, also involved supporting NWL operators while 
  18 
they learned how to run the plant; Adritz made itself available online to run the plant 
remotely should NWL operators encounter serious difficulties.  
 
While it was recognised that a non-ideal staff profile had slowed learning, progress was 
made nevertheless. Aiding this progress was a deliberately flexible management approach 
in which operations shift teams functioned relatively autonomously. Each shift developed 
its own approach and then distributed this learning through the rotation of operators 
through different teams and roles. As this process went on the knowledge developed by 
the shift teams was captured by operations managers and formalised into standard 
operating procedures. However, despite a strong team spirit amongst the RSTC operators, 
conflicts of interest and barriers to learning did still occur. Operational staff at Bran Sands 
took time, for example, to accept the need for formal monitoring procedures. In the ‘early 
days’ the sludge mix (the wet cake and dried pre-mix material) was tested by ‘feel’ alone; 
an operator would squeeze the mix to estimate its water content. Clearly, although the 
operator knew whether the mixture was ‘OK’, he could not state precisely what the dry-
solid mix was. While it was recognised that tacit skills like these were an essential part of 
the day-to-day running of the plant, it was also recognised by operations management that 
a more systematic monitoring process was needed to collect data useful in the 
longitudinal monitoring of the plant. Problematically, because the operators’ focus was 
upon day-to-day operations, they found it difficult to see how this added value. However, 
the problem proved not to be insurmountable. To encourage operators on board with the 
data collection process NWL ensured that they were aware of what the information was 
being used for (i.e. long-range operational planning and process performance 
measurement). This suggests that knowledge processes (production, transfer and use) 
need to be carefully and sensitively managed, particularly in cases where the usefulness of 
the knowledge generated is viewed differently by different groups.  
 
 
Organisational learning  
 
The broader NWL business has also had to adjust, in terms of company-wide operating 
procedures, to owning a technology which, for it at least, was radically new (a processing 
plant rather than a treatment works). However, the business was more distant from the 
mundane day-to-day reality of operating the plant and was not necessarily in touch with 
operational issues. Clearly identifiable problems such as those aired at the SSG, which 
could form the basis for well-defined research projects, travelled more easily around the 
organisation and were able to attract attention and funding. Other issues (such as out-
dated procedures) were less visible and had to be solved on a more ad-hoc basis locally. 
NWL’s existing purchasing procedure, for instance, had to be modified locally at Bran 
Sands in order to secure the delivery of spares into the plant in time to keep the process 
running (continuous chemical processing plants cannot wait for spares). Similarly, in 
order to deal with the complexities associated with doing maintenance work on the 
RSTC, operators at Bran Sands developed their own ‘Work Control Permits’. These 
controlled who was allowed to work on the plant and what they were allowed to do. 
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Arguably, organisational, geographical and even cognitive distance from the complex 
operational realities constituted by Bran Sands acted as a hindrance to the transfer of 
knowledge across NWL and to NWL’s broader adjustment to the new technology. In 
some senses Bran Sands was treated as an island of competence by the business. It 
regarded the RSTC, in particular, as a unique and isolated activity which was unlikely to 
become part of ongoing business activities (i.e. it was unlikely to build more plants of this 
nature). 
 
 
Discussion and conclusions 
 
The case study presented makes it clear that the incentives to engage in knowledge 
generation and sharing wax and wane over the life of a project. In this case high levels of 
knowledge creation characterised by feasibility, followed by an apparent dip in interest as 
the project entered its building phase9, followed by renewed learning for those actors who 
remained involved in the project, as attempts were made to embed the technology into the 
client organisation. Although, at this stage of the project, suppliers and contractors were 
focussed on projects elsewhere, it was still possible for the client to draw them back into 
the learning process by paying them (as in the case of Andritz). 
 
The case study also made clear that knowledge creation and knowledge sharing occurs 
best when participants gain mutual advantage from so doing. The sharing and co-
generation of knowledge between different groups and project stages was also best 
achieved when those involved all saw the value of the knowledge being generated. 
Problems occurred when different groups perceived and defined the project’s goals 
differently, thereby valuing particular knowledge differently. In this case study, for 
example, project managers placed less emphasis on drawing from either operational 
experience or on providing knowledge for future operations. This can be explained by the 
tendency for project delivery teams to view their success in terms of the measurable 
parameters of delivery (e.g. on time and to cost) and, therefore, to give priority to 
generating the knowledge that will enable them to do that. For similar reasons, operations 
management had problems getting operators formally to record codifiable operations 
data, and project and operations staff both experienced difficulties in getting the business 
to respond to the new demands made by an unfamiliar technology (see Table 1 below). 
 
Table 1. The knowledge strategies of key groups in the project 
 
Approach to 
Knowledge 
Operators Design Engineers Investment 
Delivery team 
Project Sponsor 
General 
approach to 
knowledge 
Refine 
operational 
knowledge to 
Advance knowledge 
along technology 
trajectory. Project is 
Specification 
focuses new 
knowledge creation 
Knowledge as 
‘experience’ – 
exploited through 
                                                           
9
 The reasons for this stemmed largely from project actors subscribing to the idea that completion times and 
costs were a greater threat to success than imperfect design choices. 
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(knowledge 
strategy) 
improve 
operations. 
source of 
experimentation and 
learning. 
to ensure key 
project goals are 
met on time and to 
budget. 
application to new 
problems and 
domains. 
Approach to 
sharing 
knowledge with 
the other 
groups 
Externalising 
knowledge of 
problems may 
lead to support in 
solving them. 
Sharing knowledge 
across organisational 
and community 
boundaries may lead 
to useful design feed-
back.  
Knowledge shared 
internally to solve 
delivery problems.  
Sharing knowledge 
about operations 
can improve 
‘design for 
operation’. 
Attitude to 
inputs to 
knowledge 
from outside 
Knowledge 
inputs from 
outside augments 
own learning.  
Knowledge input 
from other groups 
welcome (product 
improvement). 
Knowledge inputs 
from outside can 
form a complication 
to project delivery.  
This role is about 
knowledge flow. 
Knowledge inputs 
flow from 
operations to 
design. 
Generating 
knowledge for 
other groups 
Expect inputs 
(e.g. manuals, 
results from 
research projects) 
not outputs 
Accepted part of a 
‘professional’ 
engineering service.  
Completion of the 
physical project is 
the ‘traditional’ 
priority. 
This is a key 
function of the 
sharing of 
experience. 
 
It follows from this that successful knowledge management in the dynamic and complex 
environment constituted by projects must begin from an understanding of where the 
motivations to exchange knowledge do or do not exist. This analysis would be 
underpinned by extensive existing knowledge of the commercial, strategic and 
institutional drivers of different groups in the project process. With this knowledge, the 
case study also demonstrates that it is possible to then manufacture ‘temporary contexts’ 
that will support knowledge creation and sharing where it is weak. The DOG was a good 
example of how this can be achieved. The DOG, in effect, attacked the divisions 
(cultural, temporal and contractual) between communities such as designers, contractors 
and operators by bringing them together and giving them a common focus on identifying 
and solving specific operation/design problems.  
 
The findings of the case study, and in particular the success of the DOG in motivating 
knowledge creation and exchange between different groups, also have implications for 
the extent to which social barriers to knowledge creation and exchange (i.e. the human-
centred approach to knowledge management) should be seen as determining influences 
on knowledge management activity. The impact of communities (Bresnen et al., 2003) 
and activity systems (Blackler, 1993; Blackler et al.,1998, ) in limiting knowledge 
sharing, for example, was not as strong as expected. This is surprising, given the gulf 
between the communities of designers (Andritz), operators and investment delivery, in 
terms of their approach to knowledge generation and sharing (see Table 1 above). The 
DOG, however, seemed well able to overcome such difficulties and to create a shared 
space, rather like that envisaged by Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) and Nonaka and Konno 
(1998), in which all three communities alluded to in the table viewed knowledge 
exchange positively. The key strength of the DOG in this regard was in getting 
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participants to focus on the same knowledge problems, but from the perspective of their 
own interests. In other words, whereas designers saw feedback for improved design, 
operators saw issues for operations (with long-term operations in mind) and project 
managers saw a ‘snagging list’ (the conclusion of which would allow them to close-out 
the project). The case study shows, therefore, that while project barriers clearly do exist, 
and while project managers should be aware of them, they should also feel confident that 
(temporary) organisational spaces can be created that will re-configure motivations and 
support knowledge creation and exchange where needed. 
 
In terms of creating a suitable management response to these findings, the issue of 
motivation seems an appropriate focus. The likely motivations of communities and 
groups in different parts and stages of the project to generate and share knowledge need 
to be identified and, where weak, addressed. Where necessary, existing ways of 
organising need to be re-thought to facilitate and motivate necessary knowledge sharing.  
As this case study shows, there are plenty of tools available to do just this (research 
projects, out-of-project goal-orientated teams, project reviews, project sponsors and so 
forth) so what should concern project managers is less the type of tools that are available 
and more the motivations amongst their staff to use them. So for example, project and 
business managers should be seeking to create shared spaces (in this case the DOG) and 
scenarios (the design competition) capable of constructing a common focus for 
knowledge creation and sharing. Knowledge-focussed roles, i.e. roles that can formally 
bridge the gaps between key groups and communities particularly those with limited 
existing incentives to share knowledge, should also be considered.  However, those in 
these roles should be empowered to effect changes in behaviour where they deem it 
necessary. Contractually-binding incentives should also be in place to ensure that 
promised knowledge transfer takes place (e.g. the production of manuals) on time. Some 
issues may be harder to address because they stem from the setting of conflicting 
priorities elsewhere in the business, for example, the fact that staff were not released for 
training until close to the operations state date.  These are not matters that can be rectified 
at the project level but need to be negotiated between the project team and the business at 
an early stage.  
  
It remains that a single case study, while able to evidence the importance of an issue, in 
this case the importance of motivation in generating and sharing knowledge in projects, 
cannot provide enough data to document all of the interventions which may be successful 
in encouraging it. Further, the findings of a single case study, in what is technologically a 
very specific context, may prove not to be generalisable to other contexts. Nevertheless, 
we would anticipate that much will be generalisable to other contexts in which projects 
are the key organising principle. In this case study, the motivations to share knowledge 
appeared to be distributed across groups (designers, operators, contractors, suppliers) in 
ways that appear logical without reference to the specifics of this case study. Further 
research in this area should, therefore, seek to: a) confirm the findings of this case study 
in other contexts (i.e. confirm the importance of motivation in the generation and sharing 
of knowledge); and b) to explore the nature of the sorts of interventions taken in other 
contexts (i.e. to create a comprehensive toolkit of interventions). We anticipate pursuing a 
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research agenda that would foreground practical issues in knowledge management within 
projects with a focus on the means through which knowledge transfer problems are 
solved by project managers and workers through planning and through down-stream 
interventions in existing processes.   
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